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Why the $25M Ethereum MEV Case Fell Apart: A Judge Found No Rulebook to Break

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Twelve seconds and about $25 million. That is what federal prosecutors said Anton and James Peraire-Bueno took from Ethereum in April 2023, and on November 16 a federal judge in New York acquitted both brothers on every count, ruling that the government never identified a material lie.

The reason is narrower than the coverage suggests. Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke did not find that the brothers behaved well, and she did not decide whether maximal extractable value is lawful. She found that the prosecution could not point to a material misrepresentation, because the market it described has no rules for a lie to violate.

“The question before the Court is not whether the Peraire-Buenos’ conduct was right or moral, or even whether it violated uncharged crimes,” Clarke wrote at the top of the 46-page opinion and order . “It is simply whether the evidence at trial, construed in a light most favorable to the Government, could support wire fraud and related convictions in this case.” Her answer was no. The document is entry 294 on the case docket , 24-cr-293, and it closes a prosecution the court itself calls “first of its kind.”

A trap built out of other people’s trades

The scheme had a name. The brothers called it Omakase, and according to the opinion it went live on April 23, 2023, aimed at a narrow group: traders running bots that sandwich other people’s swaps. Sandwich trading is the practice of placing a buy immediately before a large pending trade and a sell immediately after it, capturing the price move the victim’s own order creates. It is unpopular, it is legal on Ethereum, and it depends entirely on being able to predict which transactions will land in the next block.

Omakase attacked that predictability. The opinion describes “lure transactions” written to appeal to the sandwich bots and to entice them into the same trades that were normally profitable. The bots took the bait and committed millions of dollars of tokens. Then the exploit: a coding vulnerability that let the brothers see transactions the sandwich traders believed were private, and propose replacement transactions that stopped the strategy from working. “Doing so resulted in the sandwich traders losing millions of dollars in cryptocurrency within seconds,” the court wrote.

The mechanics only make sense against Ethereum’s block-building market. Validators choose what goes into a block. MEV-Boost , built by Flashbots as an implementation of proposer-builder separation, lets a validator take blocks from a competitive market of builders through relays instead of building its own. Ethereum commits one block every twelve seconds , so a searcher who can see pending order flow has a single slot in which to act. The government’s own framing was that the brothers made $25 million inside that slot.

The arithmetic is worth sitting with. At the $1,803.48 ether price CoinGecko recorded at 12:25 UTC on November 18, $25 million is about 13,862 ETH, or roughly 0.011% of ether’s $220.4 billion market value. Divided by twelve seconds, the proceeds run at about $2.08 million per second. Whatever else the case was, it was not a rounding error in the block-building market.

Seven alleged lies, three theories, and one missing element

Wire fraud requires a material misrepresentation. That single element is where the prosecution came apart, and the opinion is unusually blunt about why. The court says it “repeatedly attempted” to pin down which statements the government believed were false, from the motion to dismiss through pretrial conferences. At one stage prosecutors listed seven: posing as an honest MEV-Boost validator, planting the bait transactions, misleadingly requesting a block from the relay, inserting false data to unblind the requested block, falsely committing to validate it, doctoring the block by swapping the bait transactions out, and submitting the doctored block.

By the time of the acquittal motion, the court reduced the argument to three features of Omakase: the lure transactions, the signature on the block header, and the failure to follow MEV-Boost’s specifications. Each was tested and each failed.

What prosecutors called the deception What the court found
The lure transactions signalled an intent to trade that the brothers did not have The lure transactions were never withdrawn. They were published in a block within a minute of execution, a fact the court notes is not in dispute.
The conduct was equivalent to spoofing on a regulated exchange “The lure transactions in Omakase were not placed on a regulated market with rules prohibiting this conduct.”
Signing the block header promised the block would be published The signature commits a validator to propose the block or be slashed. The brothers signed with the correct address and were slashed, so the header was accurate.
The brothers ignored binding MEV-Boost rules The specifications are “a written description” of the ecosystem, and the Omakase validator used the Ultrasound Relay, not a Flashbots relay.

Spoofing law stopped at the edge of a market with no rulebook

The government’s strongest analogy was spoofing, the offence that catches traders who place bids they intend to cancel in order to create the appearance of demand. Courts have convicted on it because an exchange is a regulated venue with published rules against the practice, so every order carries an implicit promise that the trader means it.

Clarke rejected the comparison on two grounds. The lure transactions were executed, not cancelled. And they were not placed on a regulated market at all. “The analogy to spoofing fails on Ethereum,” she wrote, because the trades “were not placed on a regulated market with rules prohibiting this conduct.”

The opinion then goes further into protocol design than most crypto cases ever reach. It records testimony that Ethereum “relies primarily on economic incentives to influence validator behavior and lacks rules by design,” that the network “is an explicitly trustless environment,” and that “it is the validator’s prerogative to add any block to the chain that it wants—that is, to propose transactions in any order it chooses.” In that environment, the court said, users expect validators to act in their own rational self-interest, “whatever that is.”

That reasoning cuts against the idea that MEV-Boost’s published specifications function as a rulebook a prosecutor can enforce. The opinion notes that the specifications exist “to help you figure out how to interact with” the relays, and that the government produced no witness from Ultrasound to describe rules binding on its users.

A signature that promised a slashing, not a publication

The most technical holding concerns the block header. When a validator signs one, the court found, it is not certifying that the block is publishable. It is identifying itself so the incentive layer can work: the signature is a commitment to propose that block or lose stake. Because the Omakase validator signed with the address that could be, and was, slashed, the header conveyed accurate information. “There are no rules in Ethereum that require a validator to propose valid blocks,” the opinion states.

What actually made the exploit possible was a missing check on the other side. “The success of Omakase hinged on the fact that the relay was not checking the contents of the parent and state roots in the returned blockheader, and for that reason, the false signature is incapable of being material.” Read plainly: the vulnerability was in the relay’s validation, and criminal fraud is a poor fit for a counterparty that never looked.

That is the part operators should read twice. A signed header is a bid with collateral attached, not a warranty about the contents of the block. Relays and builders that treat the signature as a guarantee are trusting a party the protocol expects to act in its own interest. The case law now says a validator who games that trust is not automatically a fraudster.

What the ruling does not decide

Four limits matter more than the result.

It is not a finding of honesty. The conclusion quotes the standard the court applied and then sets it aside: “This case is not about whether the Peraire-Buenos’ conduct ‘was improper, objectionable, or even despicable.'” Nor is it about whether the conduct “departed from traditional notions of fundamental honesty and fair play.”

It covers three counts, nothing else. The money-laundering conspiracy fell only because the wire-fraud predicate did. “Without wire fraud, the predicate unlawful activity is absent,” the court wrote. The opinion says nothing about commodities law, securities law, state statutes, or civil claims by the traders who lost money. It is a district court decision, which binds the parties before it and not other courts.

Hiding identity was not enough. Prosecutors argued that the brothers concealed who they were and what they were doing. The court held that evidence could not substitute for a specific false statement, and that the scheme as a whole could not fill the gap.

It records a due-process worry. In a footnote the court declines to decide whether the superseding indictment violated the brothers’ due process rights, then adds: “The Court, however, acknowledges that this prosecution raises serious due process concerns.”

The opinion leans on an earlier Manhattan acquittal for the same reason. In the Mango Markets case, the court found no rules prohibiting the defendant’s conduct on that platform, and Clarke cites that decision when distinguishing the spoofing precedents. Two judges in the same district, on two different platforms, have now failed to fit on-chain trading strategies into a wire-fraud statute written for statements between people.

It also lands next to a case moving the other way. The same U.S. Attorney’s office charged two Robinhood engineers in September over trades placed on confidential listing information, a theory built on a breach of confidence rather than on protocol design. And the stake base the dispute depends on keeps growing: 43.80 million ETH sat in validators at the end of the third quarter, equal to 35.9% of supply, per Bitwise’s Q4 report.

The twelve-second clock is the part that repeats

A judgment of acquittal is a statement about evidence, not about markets. The number that made this case famous, $25 million in twelve seconds, is also the number that explains why it will not be the last: the reward for finding a crack in the block-building pipeline is measured against a twelve-second clock, and the cost of being wrong about the law has now been tested once, in the government’s least favorite direction.

For searchers and builders, the practical lesson is subtractive. The opinion removes one theory of liability for conduct that stays inside the protocol’s own rules, and it leaves the older theories intact for conduct that steps outside them: false statements to counterparties, fabricated identities used to obtain access, off-chain promises, and anything a regulator can frame as manipulation of a venue that does have rules. The line is not “on-chain is legal.” The line is whether there is a rulebook to point to.

What happens next is measurable rather than rhetorical. Watch whether relays publish validation requirements for returned block headers, whether builders add parent and state root checks to their acceptance logic, and whether the government brings a case against conduct that includes an identifiable false statement to a named counterparty. Those three signals will show whether the ruling changed behavior or only closed a file.

Frequently Asked Questions

Did the judge rule that MEV is legal?

No. Clarke ruled that the evidence at trial could not support wire fraud or the related money-laundering conspiracy. The opinion states repeatedly that it takes no view on whether the conduct was moral, and it does not address commodities law, securities law, or state claims.

Why was there no second trial after the jury deadlocked?

The defense moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 after the mistrial. The court granted that motion on all three counts, entered a judgment of acquittal for both brothers, and directed the clerk to close the case, terminating the two pending motions at entries 225 and 239.

Is sandwich trading itself a crime now?

The opinion describes sandwich trading as “a controversial practice” and does not criminalise it. The victims in this case were sandwich bots, and the court’s reasoning turned on the absence of rules governing the block-building market rather than on the merits of sandwiching.

How is this different from the Mango Markets case?

Both turned on the same missing element. In the Mango Markets prosecution, the court found no rules prohibiting the defendant’s conduct on that platform, and Clarke cites that decision when distinguishing the spoofing cases, which depend on a regulated venue with explicit rules against the conduct.

Could a regulator still bring a case over the same trades?

The ruling binds only the three counts in this indictment. A different charge, a different statute, or a civil action by the traders who lost funds would raise different elements, and the opinion expresses no view on any of them.


Prices: CoinGecko , 18 November 2026, 12:25 UTC. Case documents: U.S. v. Peraire-Bueno, 24-cr-293 (JGLC), S.D.N.Y., Document 294, filed 16 November 2026.

This article is for information only and is not investment or legal advice. Educational purposes only.

The post Why the $25M Ethereum MEV Case Fell Apart: A Judge Found No Rulebook to Break appeared first on BlockchainReporter .

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